Please Wait...

The Justification of Inference - A Navya Nyaya Approach (An Old and Rare Book)

The Justification of Inference - A Navya Nyaya Approach (An Old and Rare Book)
$31.00
Item Code: NAR761
Author: Dr. Raghunath Ghosh
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan
Language: English
Edition: 1990
ISBN: 8121700817
Pages: 160
Cover: HARDCOVER
Other Details: 9.00 X 5.50 inch
weight of the book: 0.28 kg
About the Book

It is an attempt to justify inference as a source of valid knowledge by way of pointing out the means of ascertaining Vyapti (Vyapatigraha) from the Navya Nyaya standpoint. The Carvakas believe that the inference can not be taken as a source of valid knowledge because the knowledge of Vyapti which is the special cause (Karapa) of inference cannot be known by any means and hence prediction about future is not justifiable. Here an effort has been made to refute the view of the Carvilas and rehabilitate Anumina as a source of Prama following the line of Gangesa and other Navya Naiya"yikas. By way of substantiating the Navya Nyaya view the views of the Buddhists, Jainas, Advaita Vedantins and other systems of Indian Philosophy (who admit Anumina as a source of Prama) have been put forward and carefully refuted. In the connection the role of Tarka in removing the doubt of Vyaptigraha (ascertainment of Vygpti) has been discussed in order to justify inference. The conclusive part of the book deals with some critical and evaluative remarks on the view of the Navya Naiyayakas.

Preface

The present work entitled: The Justification of Inference : A Navya Nyaya Approach' is an attempt to justify inference or Anumana as a source of valid cognition (Pramcina). The Carvakas do not accept Anumana as a Pramana in as much as it cannot provide us with the certain cognition of an object existing in future. In other words, the Carvakas have proved that the ascertainment of Vyapti (Vyaptigraha) between a Hetu and a Sadhya existing in past, present and future and in different spaces is not possible through perception etc. Due to the impossibility of the ascertainment of Vycipti Anumana at best can give us the probable cognition of an object, but not certain. Hence, Inference is not justified as a Pramana. In this book an attempt has been made to justify inference as a Pramana by way of pointing out the means of ascertaining Vylipti (Vyc-ptigrahopcya) following the line of the Navya Nayayakas like Ganges, Mathurnath etc. In connection with substantiating the conclusion of the Neo-logicians the theories of the older logicians, Vedantins, Jainas, Buddhists etc. have been discussed and their views have also been briefly evaluated and critically adjudged at the same time. Without refuting the prima-facie arguments the older logicians, the Neo-logicians and the philosophers of all other branches of Indian Philosophy do not arrive at their conclusions. Ganges, the author of Tattvacintamani who is the pioneer of the Neo-logicians, critically examines the view of the opponents (Purvapaksa) at first and draws his own conclusion afterwards.

This book is the result of an intensive study on the means of ascertaining Vyc7pti. Those who accept Inference as a special source of valid cognition (Pramana) admit the importance of invariable concomitance (Vyapti). Though much importance has been laid on the discussion as to the means of ascertaining Vyapti yet a brief account of the nature of Vyapti and the role of inference in our day to day life have also been put forward. Though some research works on the nature of vyapti have been done earlier by some Scholars, the discussion on this topic again finds justification on the ground that without knowing the nature of Vyapti the means of ascertaining it cannot be understood properly. This phenomenon has also been supported by Ganges'a who at first establishes the validity (Pramava) of inference and at the end of the chapter says that now the means of ascertaining Vyapti is to be discussed (Vyaptigrahopc-iyadca vak-s been found ate).1 But in the following chapter it has means und that five prima facie definitions a Vyapti instead of the of Vyaptigraha have been discussed. this impression in his mind that without throwing some light on the nature of Vyapti mere discussion on the means of ascertaining it will not be of much use. In the same way it would be improper to discuss the nature of Vyapti without giving a brief account of inference and its role in our day to day life.

Sample Pages








Add a review

Your email address will not be published *

For privacy concerns, please view our Privacy Policy

Post a Query

For privacy concerns, please view our Privacy Policy

CATEGORIES

Related Items